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The works assembled here are the initial  outputs of the First International  Summer
Institute on Artificial  Intelligence and Society (SAIS).  The Summer Institute was
convened from July 21 to 24, 2019 at the Alberta Machine Intelligence Institute (Amii)
in Edmonton, in conjunction with the 2019 Deep Learning/Reinforcement Learning
Summer School.  The Summer Institute was jointly sponsored by the AI Pulse project
of the UCLA School of Law (funded by a generous grant from the Open Philanthropy
Project)  and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR),  and was co-
organized by Ted Parson (UCLA School of Law),  Alona Fyshe (University of Alberta
and Amii),  and Dan Lizotte (University of Western Ontario).  The Summer Institute
brought together a distinguished international  group of 80 researchers,
professionals,  and advanced students from a wide range of disciplines and areas of
expertise,  for three days of intensive mutual instruction and collaborative work on
the societal  implications of AI,  machine learning,  and related technologies.  The
scope of discussions at the Summer Institute was broad, including all  aspects of the
societal  impacts of AI,  alternative approaches to their governance,  and associated
ethical  issues.
Inspired by recent triumphs in machine learning applications,  issues of the societal
impacts, governance, and ethics of these technologies are seeing a surge of concern,
research and policy attention. These rapid linked advances – in multiple linked areas
of algorithm development,  data and data-handling tools,  and hardware-based
computational  ability – are a leading current concern about technology’s potential
for profound and disruptive societal  transformation.
In part,  current concerns about AI reprise familiar themes from other areas of high-
stakes technological  advance,  so the existing body of research on these other
technology areas offers insights relevant for AI.  A few of these insights are
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especially prominent.  For example,  the rate and character of technological  change
are shaped not just by scientific knowledge but also by the economic,  policy/legal,
and social/cultural  conditions that determine relevant actors’  incentives and
opportunities.  Societal impacts are not intrinsic to characteristics of technology, but
depend strongly on how it  is  developed, integrated into products and services,  and
used – and how people adjust their behavior around it:  As Kranzberg’s first  law of
technology tells us, “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”1 Together,
the conjunction of rapid technical  change and uncertain uses and responses
challenge efforts to govern the associated impacts, so governance often merely aims
to mitigate the worst impacts after the fact.  Even when societal  impacts are
profound, they tend to emerge gradually in response to repeated adaptations of
technology,  deployment,  and behavior,  and are thus difficult  to project,  assess,  or
manage in advance.
These broad parallels with prior areas of technological  advance and associated
societal  concerns are real,  but there are also reasons to expect that AI may be
different,  and more serious,  in its impacts and implications.  What is  popularly called
“AI” is  not one thing,  but a cluster of multiple algorithmic methods,  some new and
some old, which are linked to parallel advances in the scale and management of data,
computational capacity, and multiple related application areas. This set of advancing
capabilities is  diffuse,  labile,  and hard to define – a particular challenge to
governance,  since the ability to workably define something is  normally a
precondition for any legal or regulatory response. AI is also foundational, potentially
able to transform multiple other technologies,  research fields,  and decision areas –
to the extent that its impact has been credibly compared to that of electricity or
fossil  fuels in prior industrial  revolutions.
AI’s societal impacts thus present deep uncertainties, for good or ill. Expert views of
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what it  will  do,  and how fast,  span a broad range: from the cumulation of many
incremental changes, to existential transformations of human capabilities, prospects,
societies, and identities. Even setting aside “singularity” issues – potential general or
super-intelligent AI that might threaten (or in some accounts,  transcend) human
survival  and autonomy – multiple mechanisms of impact have been identified by
which even continued development of AI short of these landmarks could have
transformative societal impacts. Examples include large-scale displacement of human
livelihoods,  disruption of geopolitical  security relationships,  transforming (or
undermining) collective decision-making processes through democratic governments
or other institutions,  extreme concentration of wealth and power (perhaps based on
new mechanisms of power),  and large-scale changes in human capabilities and
identities.  Even limiting attention to present and near-term developments,  there are
a host of concerns raised by current AI applications – e.g.,  safety and security of
systems, bias in algorithmic decision-making,  threats to privacy,  and inscrutability of
decisions – some of which may also give early warning signs of coming larger-scale
impacts.
Relative to the scale and gravity of potential  impacts,  present debate on AI and
Society presents a seeming paradox.  The issue is receiving a flood of attention,  with
dozens of new programs, a rapid flow of resources,  and meetings and conferences
seemingly every week.  Yet well-founded insights remain scarce on the nature and
mechanisms of impacts,  effective and feasible means of governing them, and
associated ethical issues. There has been relatively little convergence or progress on
major questions, which in many cases remain not just unanswered but also subject to
wide uncertainty and disagreement,  or even not yet clearly posed.2  Because AI is  so
labile and weakly defined, studying its impacts has been likened to the ancient
Buddhist parable of the blind men and the elephant: each observer feels that part of
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the unfamiliar thing that is  closest to them, so each thinks they know it;  yet their
views are all partial and mutually contradictory. As with the elephant, it is possible to
approach AI impacts from any discipline or field of inquiry (e.g.,  corporate law,
anthropology,  Marxist social  history),  any area of interest (education,  finance,
climate change),  any political  or ethical  concern (racial  justice,  social  mobility,
privacy,  due process),  or any prior technological  analogy,  and find something
resonant.  Pulled by these centrifugal  forces,  the debate is  thus unhelpfully sub-
divided along multiple dimensions and lacks a coherent core.
There is  also continued disagreement over where the most important impacts sit  in
time and scale,  yielding a distribution of present attention and concern that is  bi-
modal.  To be a little glib,  those whose disciplinary perspectives make them most
comfortable with speculative reasoning – often technical  AI researchers and
philosophers – are attracted to endpoint,  singularity-related issues,  which lend
themselves to elegant, analytically rich theoretical inquiries. Most other researchers,
on the other hand, gravitate to current concerns and historical  precedents,  because
their disciplines frown on speculation and favor arguments based on observable (i.e.,
present or past)  data and evidence. These areas of inquiry are both valuable and
important,  yet they leave disturbingly empty the large middle ground of impacts and
challenges lying between these endpoints – where AI might transform people and
societies by vastly reconfiguring capabilities,  information,  and behavior,  while still
remaining (mostly)  under human control.3  At the same time, while there is  a
widespread sense that early action is  needed to assess and limit risks of severe
harmful impacts,  there is  little knowledge, and even less agreement,  on what that
action should consist of or how it  should be developed.
This description of the range of issues posed by AI and the state of present debate
underpin the aims of the Summer Institute. Just as AI and its impacts present a huge
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societal  challenge,  so too does mobilizing existing bodies of experience,  knowledge,
and methods to effectively inform the assessment and management of its impacts.
These challenges will  not be surmounted by any single insight, study, or activity. The
summer institute aimed to point,  tentatively,  at a direction of efforts that can
advance and expand the debate,  establish an early model of the kind of collective
engagement needed, and – by seeding cross-disciplinary networks for continued
collaborations – contribute to the long-run project of building the needed capacity.
The summer institute pursued this aim in two ways.  First,  it  sought to convene the
needed broadly interdisciplinary dialog,  with the ability to integrate knowledge and
experience from multiple technical,  scientific,  and humanistic domains,  and to resist
widespread tendencies to converse mainly within existing disciplinary communities.
In seeking this breadth of expertise contributing to the discussions,  the summer
institute benefited from its co-convening between a program on AI and Society
based at a leading law school,  and the CIFAR Deep Learning and Reinforcement
Learning Summer School –  a vehicle for advanced technical  AI training with a
distinguished international  group of faculty and advanced students.  Yet even with
the right breadth of expertise in the room, making such interdisciplinary interactions
productive takes sustained hard work to understand each other, clarify key concepts
and methods,  and build new conceptual  and communication skills.  These aims are
better advanced by sustained collaborative work on problems of commonly
recognized importance than by discussions that lack such common goals,  which tend
toward superficiality.  Second, it  is  clear that understanding and addressing AI-
related impacts is  a long-term, even inter-generational  project,  which must combine
mutual instruction with advancing inquiry,  aiming to both advance the debate and
broaden its participation by engaging more junior and more senior thinkers on
collegial  terms.
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To pursue these aims,  the summer institute experimented with a novel two-part
structure,  with the first  part tightly programmed and structured by the organizers
and the second part left almost entirely to the collective, bottom-up authority of the
group. The first part aimed to provide the essential  foundation of common
knowledge and concepts to enable people from a wide range of fields and career
stages to participate effectively and confidently in the discussions.  To this end, the
institute opened with a day of short,  focused briefings by faculty experts,  each
covering elements from their expertise they judged essential  for anyone to be an
informed participant in the debates. These briefings were grouped into four sessions
organized by broad subject-matter:
– Recent advances and current technical issues in AI and Machine Learning (briefings
by Graham Taylor on Deep Learning,  Rich Sutton on Reinforcement Learning,  and
Dirk Hovy on Natural  Language Processing);
–  Current issues and controversies in AI societal  impacts (briefings by Elizabeth Joh
on use of AI in policing and criminal  justice;  Michael Karlin on military uses of AI;
Trooper Sanders on biased data, its implications and potential correctives; and Elana
Zeide on use of predictive analytics in education and employment);
–  Alternative approaches to governance of AI and its impacts (briefings by Geoffrey
Rockwell  on the historical  trajectory of concerns about automation and proposed
responses;  Gary Marchant on limits to hard-law approaches,  and potential  soft-law
and international alternatives; Brenda Leong on corporate AI ethics boards and their
limitations;  and Craig Shank on internal  corporate controls and multi-stakeholder
governance processes);
–  Larger-scale and medium-term issues (briefings by Jason Millar on embedded
values in navigation and mobility systems; Evan Selinger on facial  recognition and its
implications;  Osonde Osoba and Casey Bouskill  on technology-culture interactions
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in AI impacts and governance; and Robert Lempert on large-scale societal
implications of alternative approaches to algorithm design).
Following the briefings,  the rest of the Summer Institute was dedicated to
collaborative work on projects that were not pre-specified,  but instead were
developed and proposed by individual  participants,  then selected in real  time by all
participants choosing which of the proposed projects they wanted to work on.  Any
participant, regardless of seniority, was invited to propose a workgroup project via a
statement posted online and a short oral “pitch” presentation to the group, followed
by brief clarifying discussion.  In selecting projects,  participants were urged to
consider a few explicit  criteria – that the projects address interesting and important
issues related to AI and society,  that they not duplicate existing work,  and that they
offer the prospect of meaningful  progress in the limited time available.  Otherwise,
there was no central  control  of projects proposed or chosen. The form of proposed
projects was completely unconstrained, explicitly including making a start on
collaborative research projects,  drafting op-eds or other non-specialist  publications,
developing proposed contributions to policy or governance, developing instructional
material,  or creating a story or other work of art on the theme of AI and society.
From twelve proposals,  the group selected eight highly diverse projects to work on.
The resultant eight groups worked intensively over a day and a half, in a process that
several  participants likened to a hack-a-thon. The analogy is  suggestive but only
partly accurate,  in that that each SI workgroup included a wide range of disciplinary
skills  and expertise,  and each pursued a different project,  all  generated by
participants rather than pre-specified by organizers.  The entire group convened
briefly in plenary at half-day intervals to hear short reports from each workgroup
summarizing what they were doing,  what progress they had achieved, what
completed output they targeted by the end of the SI,  and what help they needed
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from the rest of the group. All eight workgroups achieved substantial progress by the
end of the summer institute,  even within the extremely limited time available.  All
eight also expressed the intention and developed concrete plans to continue their
collaborative work after the Summer Institute – with some continuing that work
immediately afterwards.
The contributions published here represent the initial  outputs of these eight work
groups’  collaborative efforts,  as achieved during the intensive work period of the
summer institute plus a little further polishing over the following few weeks.  One
consequence of the decentralized,  bottom-up model,  with each workgroup defining
its own project,  is  that the resultant outputs are too diverse for any single
publication or communication outlet to be suitable for them all.  Yet in order to have
a single vehicle that captures the collective energy and themes of the SI –  and
moreover,  to communicate these while the experience is still  fresh in participants’
minds – all  workgroups agreed to disseminate interim outputs from their work for
this fast web publication.  This quickly distributed – but explicitly half-baked –
publication model was variously likened to theatrical  workshopping or rapid
prototyping in product development,  in addition to hack-a-thons.
This experimental  early publication model is  very much in line with the exploratory
and experimental  spirit  of the SI,  taking the risk of trying different models to
advance and broaden the debate.  It  also,  of course,  has the unavoidable
consequence that these works – while they reflect remarkable achievements in the
short time available – are all  provisional  and not yet fully developed. With some
variation among the workgroups,  they are presented here with the aim of being
starting points for needed discussions,  and providing concrete resources,
background information,  and proposals to move those discussions forward with
specificity.  They are not completed or polished products.
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We provide below a brief synopsis of the aims and outputs of each of the eight
workgroups.  Each workgroup is continuing to develop its project,  aiming for
publication in various outlets in line with the groups’  diverse aims and intended
audiences.  As the outlet for each workgroup’s completed work is  finalized,  we will
identify it  and,  as available,  add links to the discussions below.
Mobility Systems and Embedded Values
This group used the example of the now-ubiquitous,  AI-driven,  turn-by-turn
navigation systems to illustrate the range of values affected by these systems,
whether explicitly or not.  They then considered the resultant implications for
societal impacts of projected large-scale expansion and integration of these systems,
moving from separate navigation apps used by individual  drivers,  to complete urban
mobility systems integrating signaling and multiple types of human-driven and
autonomous vehicles,  private and public.  Navigation apps may at first  glance seem
prosaic,  but the exploration was surprisingly rich.  Present implementations of these
systems seek to minimize individual  drivers’  travel time between a given origin and
destination,  with limited options to tune results to individual  preferences such as
avoiding freeways.  But since their early deployment,  a collateral  impact of these
systems has been increased traffic in residential  neighborhoods – an impact well
known to the planners who design streets, signals, and signage, but not recognized as
implicated in individual  navigation systems until  large numbers of drivers began
taking the same recommended shortcuts through side streets.  The group identified
several  additional  values affected by mobility design systems, which will  require
explicit  consideration as the scope and integration of systems increases.  In addition
to travel time and neighborhood character,  these include safety (at the individual
level for drivers, pedestrians, and other street users, and collectively); allocation and
prioritization of mobility access among types of users (now implemented simply,
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through right-of-way for emergency vehicles,  HOV or toll  lanes,  etc.,  but potentially
generalizable in multiple ways with fully integrated systems);  and policing strategy
and resource allocation,  among others – including an unexpected linkage to the
important role presently played by traffic fines in some local government budgets. In
this initial  published collection,  the workgroup presents a taste of their discussions
in the form of a fictitious press release,  announcing the release of a new navigation
app that generates routes based on minimizing drivers’  cognitive burden.
This group’s discussion illustrates a widespread phenomenon related to automation
of decision processes.  Societal  institutions and processes often serve multiple
values,  only some of which are explicitly articulated as their mission or objective.
Just as urban transport systems advance multiple values in addition to efficient
mobility,  so too do other organizations.  A prominent example is provided by military
services, in the United States and to different degrees in other countries. While their
explicit missions are all broadly related to national defense and security, one of their
most important social impacts – almost unrelated to their explicit missions – has long
been to provide training and life skills  to young people from disadvantaged
backgrounds,  making these organizations one of the most powerful  drivers of social
mobility.  Many institutions serve such multiple corollary or implicit  societal  values.
Automation or codification of decisions – typically with a single objective function
that aligns with the institution’s explicit,  official  mission – can put these other
implicated values at risk,  either from the automated decisions themselves or from
related organizational changes. (In military organizations, the concern arises from the
higher level of technical  skills  and education required of even entry-level recruits in
AI-rich environments.)  Yet these corollary values are challenging to integrate into
explicit algorithmic decision-making – because they are ambiguous, hard to integrate
into an objective function that trades them off against core organizational  missions,
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and potentially contestable – such that they may only flourish while flying under the
radar. As Joni Mitchell  sang in another context,  “You don’t know what you’ve got till
it’s  gone.” The loss of corollary,  emergent,  or ambiguously defined organizational
values may be a systematic consequence of automating decisions,  which typically
requires explicitly codifying what before was ambiguously embedded in
organizational  practice.4
Meaningful  Human Control
This group considered the problem of coupled human and algorithmic decision-
making in high-stakes settings,  using as initial  examples the domains of weapons,
aviation,  and medicine.  Noting the definitional  ambiguity and difficulty
operationalizing widely repeated concepts such as “humans-in-the-loop,” their initial
ambition was to unpack the meaning of “meaningful  human control” (MHC) and
identify processes and criteria to operationalize it  across these diverse decision
domains.  But the group adjusted mid-course,  recognizing that this was a longer
project and that they needed first to engage the prior question of why – and with
what conditions and limitations – meaningful  human control  is  judged desirable,  or
even essential,  in such decision contexts.  They argue that retaining meaningful
human control  carries both costs and benefits,  and that both the costs and benefits
include distinct components,  some related to system performance and some to
issues of legal  and moral  responsibility.  In general,  greater human control  may
improve system performance by increasing redundancy and adaptability to novel
conditions,  and may be necessary to ensure moral  and legal  accountability.  Yet it
may also degrade performance by requiring uncoupling of complex autonomous
systems and increase the risk of human error,  carelessness,  or other forms of
improper human decisions.  The group noted that the optimal balancing of these
factors,  and hence the preferred degree and form of human control,  are likely to
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vary substantially even among the three decision domains they consider.  The group
is continuing work on the larger project generating guidelines how to implement the
desired degree and form of human control  in particular decision types.
AI Without Math
This group began a project to develop non-technical instructional materials on key AI
and machine-learning concepts. They recognized that as deployed AI-based products
and services continue to expand, many decisions will  be required about how to
control,  explain,  and manage these.  These decisions will  include many by various
professionals who not only lack specific training in AI and Machine Learning, but may
also lack training in the underlying mathematical  and statistical  concepts that
provide the core of even introductory instruction in AI/ML. In view of this need, the
group began development of an online instructional  resource that would provide
introductory explanations of key AI/ML concepts with no use of formal mathematical
notation.  As illustrative audiences toward whom to target their explanations,  they
took journalists and judges.  Their short contribution here presents a start on this
project and an illustration of their targeted level of explanation,  including
explanations for four key concepts:  rational  agents,  naïve Bayes classifiers,  linear
regression, and convolutional neural networks. Their more extensive resource will be
an ongoing project,  to be available at https://www.aiwithoutmath.com.
Siri  Humphrey:5  Design Principles for an AI Policy Analyst
There are many studies underway of the potential  for AI tools to take on various
functions of government – legislative,  executive,  judicial,  and electoral  –  asking how
the use of AI in specific functions would work,  what it  would require,  with what
attendant benefits and risks,  and whether (and how) it  could align with applicable
legal,  democratic,  and moral  principles.  This group looked at a previously
unexamined piece of this landscape, the potential for AI systems to take over, partly
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or wholly,  the functions of policy analysts who advise senior officials or political
leaders.  Starting from recent scholarship that has identified several  distinct
functions that policy analysts perform, they examined how AI systems – either
current ones or reasonably projected extensions – could serve these functions,  with
what implications for the policy-making process and the multiple public values
implicated in policy decisions.
The group argues that AI systems could substantially replace the “synthesis” function
of policy analysis:  the gathering,  curating,  and synthesis of publicly available
information relevant to an issue or decision.  At least initially,  use of AI in this role
would have to be subject to specific limitations on the tasks delegated, and also
subject to review and revision of the resultant briefing notes or other documents
before they go to Ministers or other senior decision-makers.  The group also argues
that repetition of this synthesis and review process, with feedback from both human
policy analysts and decision-makers (such as Ministers routinely provide on briefing
materials prepared by their human staff)  could serve as high-order training for the
AI,  allowing progressive reduction – although not elimination – of the amount of
oversight and input needed from human policy analysts.  In contrast to the
“synthesis” function,  they argue that certain other policy analysis functions depend
more strongly on the essentially human interaction between decision-makers and
their advisors.  This militates against the wholesale replacement of analysis and
advising functions by AI systems, suggesting instead a model of “Artificial-
intelligence-amplified policy analysis,”  in which AI systems augment and amplify the
skills  of human policy analysts.
Assessment Tool for Ethical  impacts of AI products
The next two workgroups form a complementary pair,  both concerned with the
problem of what to do with the multiple sets of AI ethical principles being advanced
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to provide guidance for individuals or organizations engaged in AI development and
application.  These sets of principles pose two widely noted problems. First,  the
proliferation of large numbers of similar,  but not quite identical,  lists of principles
raise questions about the relationships between them, the normative foundations of
any of them, and the basis for adopting any of them over the others.6  Second, all
these principles are stated at high levels of generality and abstraction,  so their
implied guidance for what to do,  or what not to do,  in the actual  development,
design,  training,  testing,  application,  and deployment of AI-enabled systems is
indirect,  non-obvious,  and contestable.
In an unplanned piece of serendipity,  these two groups approached the same
problem from nearly opposite perspectives,  one operational  and one critical,
yielding a rich and instructive counterpoint.  This group took an operational,
constructive approach rooted in engineering. Boldly (and practically) going where no
one has gone before,  they reasoned step by step through the process of
operationalizing a particular set of ethical  principles for any AI-related product or
project.  They first  reduced each principle to a list  of specific areas of concern,  then
to operational  questions about observable practices and procedures relevant to
each area of concern,  and finally to a numerical  scoring system for alternative
answers to each question.  Subject to some remaining ambiguities about appropriate
weighting,  the resultant component scores can then be aggregated to generate an
overall  numerical  score for conformity of a system or project with the specified
principle.  The group stresses that such reductive scoring systems are prone to
various forms of misinterpretation and misuse – such as imputing false precision or
prematurely closing discussions. They also highlight that this heroic, first-cut effort is
incomplete.  Yet at the same time, they vigorously defend the approach as providing
a stimulus,  and a concrete starting point,  for the discussions of impacts and ethical
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implications that are needed in the context of specific projects and systems.
From Shortcut to Sleight-of-Hand: Why the checklist  approach in the EU guidelines
does not work
This group took as their starting point a different set of ethical  principles,  the
“Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial  Intelligence” issued by the EU
Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial  Intelligence in April  and June
2019,  including an “assessment checklist.”  This checklist  is  intended to help
technology developers consider ethical  issues in their policies and investments,  and
thus to create more trustworthy AI.  In effect,  this EU expert group undertook an
exercise quite similar to that conducted by the Summer Institute “Tools” group
summarized above, except that the EU expert group’s exercise is  more limited: it
consists only of a checklist  of yes/no questions (with extensive supporting
discussion),  and does not pursue a numerical  scoring system.
This workgroup conducted a detailed critical  assessment of the guidelines and
checklist,  aiming to assess their implications – and in particular,  their  limitations – as
a tool to guide AI development.  They argued that these guidelines are a fair  target
for such critical  scrutiny because of their likely influence and importance,  based on
their ambition to articulate a broadly applicable standard of care for AI development
and their prospect of influencing EU regulatory development – especially given the
EU’s emerging role as a world leader in this regulatory area.
The group finds the proposed approach problematic in several  ways,  most of them
related to intrinsic limitations of checklists in this context rather than problems
specific to this particular checklist.  Using the analogy of safety procedures in
aviation and space flight, they argue that checklists are an appropriate technology to
manage human-factors risks in complex environments whose operations,  salient risk
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mechanisms,  and implicated values are well  known, but that these conditions do not
apply to development of safe or ethical  AI systems. The group argues that many
items on the checklist are seriously ambiguous but lack the additional explanation or
documentation needed to reduce the ambiguity;  and that the checklist  thus risks
conveying false confidence that needed protections are in place,  when the
conditions for this to be the case are in fact subtle,  context-specific,  and evolving
over time.
Although the EU expert group’s report includes extensive discussions of caveats and
limitations,  the workgroup finds these insufficient to mitigate the risks they identify,
in view of the likely uses of the checklist  in real-world,  operational  settings.  They
worry that enterprises are likely to treat the checklist  either reductively or
opportunistically –  perhaps delegating responses to their legal  teams to seek
defensible markers of regulatory compliance or fulfilling some relevant duty of care.
Used in such ways,  the checklist  would fail  to stimulate the serious,  organization-
wide reflection on the concrete requirements of ethical conduct in their setting that
should be the aim. Moreover, the group argues, the checklist is unlikely ever to yield
a decision not to pursue an otherwise attractive project due to irreducible risks of
unacceptable outcomes,  when a meaningful  and effective ethical  filter must be
capable – at least occasionally – of generating this outcome. Finally, the group argues
that checklists are likely to be proposed or used as safe harbors – by enterprises, or
even worse,  by regulators,  judges,  citizen groups,  or political  leaders – with the
resultant risk of reducing the pursuit  of ethical  AI to empty “ethics-washing” or
“ethics theatre.”
In contrast to their sharp criticism of the checklist,  the group finds the expert
group’s higher-level “guiding questions” to be of great value,  in helping to identify
issues and problems that require sustained attention and so to promote an
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organizational  culture of heightened ethical  awareness.  But they find the pursuit  of
simplification and codification embodied in the checklist  approach to be premature,
promoting misleading,  too-optimistic assessments of risks and the subsequent
prospect of broad, destructive backlash against the AI and related technologies
broadly.
AI and Agency
This group examined the deep, and deeply contested, concept of “agency,”  as it
applies to and is modified by the context of AI development.  Working both
individually and collectively,  they wrote a set of short,  provocative essays that
approach the concept of agency from multiple disciplinary perspectives,  including
philosophy,  political  science,  sociology,  psychology,  economics,  computer science,
and law. The essays also lay out a set of deep questions and tensions inherent in the
concept. They ask how agency is defined; whether humans have it, and if so, whether
and how this distinguishes humans from present and prospective AI (and also from
other animals);  and what are the implications of alternative conceptions and
ascriptions of agency – for human behavior,  identity,  welfare,  and social  order.
The definitions they consider for agency cluster around two poles,  one positive and
one negative.  At the positive pole,  agency is  defined by the capacity for goal-
directed behavior,  and thus identified by observing robust pursuit  of a goal  in
response to obstruction. At the negative pole, agency is defined by not being subject
to causal  explanation without introducing conceptions of intention or subjectivity.
The group notes that conventional conceptions of agency as being unique to humans
are increasingly challenged on two fronts:  by human inequity in diverse social
contexts,  and hence wide variation in individual  humans’  capacities to exercise
effective agency;  and by scientific advances that suggest both that subjectively
perceived agency may be illusory, and that to the extent humans do have agency, so
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too may other animals.
Present and projected developments of AI raise the stakes of these inquiries.  The
increasing complexity of AI performance implies,  at a minimum, the lengthening of
causal  chains connecting behavior to proximate or instrumental  goals and thence to
higher-order goals, shifting the location of agency and casting doubt on simple claims
that people have it  but AI’s  do not or cannot.  Yet the connection between this
causation-driven notion of agency,  and thus the validity of societal  ascription of
responsibility and deployment of incentives,  are obscure,  in the context of both
human and AI decision-making.  Does accountability always pass back to the human
designer or creator,  no matter how many layers of intermediate goals are generated
within an AI? If  human behavior is  increasingly understood as subject to causation,
does this reduce moral  problems to correctible,  technical  ones – and if  so,
correctible by whom, in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy? Finally,  even if
strong human-other or subject-object distinctions in ascribing agency become
untenable under further advance of scientific knowledge and AI technology,  might
agency nevertheless be a useful  fiction,  a myth that is  useful  or even necessary to
believe – for stable conceptions of human identity,  and for effective collective
regulation of human behavior?
Can AI be an instrument of transformative social  and political  progress? The
“levelers” group
This group took its inspiration from a strain of political thought early in the industrial
revolution,  which identified markets and technological  innovation as powerful
engines of political  progress,  holding the prospect of large gains in both liberty and
equality.  Looking forward to the transformative possibilities of AI,  the group took a
perspective at odds with the dystopian gloom that marks much discussion of AI
impacts – and also,  for that matter,  at odds with the mixed outcomes that attended
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the actual  technological  and economic transformations of the industrial  revolution.
Instead, the group asked whether advances in AI could drive transformative social
and political  progress – and if  so,  what conditions would be necessary or helpful  in
promoting such progressive impacts.  The group considered technical  and socio-
political  conditions separately.  Are there particular technical  characteristics of
deployed AI systems that would be most compatible with the aim to increase rather
than decrease broad human liberty,  equality,  and agency? And what social,  political,
and economic conditions – including the need for viable business models – would be
most conducive to AI systems with these beneficial characteristics being successfully
developed, deployed, scaled,  and sustained over time?
Regarding technical  characteristics,  the group identified two areas that might
promise greater,  and more broadly distributed, societal  benefits than present and
projected AI development patterns,  one related to the structure of decision-making
and one related to the scale,  decision scope, and number of separate AI systems.
Most methods of algorithmic decision-making,  whether modern machine-learning or
earlier approaches,  structure their decision-making with the aim of optimizing a
single-valued objective or scoring function under a single characterization,
deterministic or probabilistic,  of conditions in the world.  An alternative approach,
rooted in concepts of satisficing,  bounded rationality,  and multi-criteria decision
making,  instead pursues decisions that perform acceptably well  under a wide range
of possible realizations of uncertainties – and also under a wide range of plausible
objectives and associated values.  The group speculated that such robustness to
diverse conditions is likely to be associated with greater pluralism of values, and with
a tentative approach to decisions that recognizes uncertainty and limited knowledge,
makes informed guesses,  and seeks additional  guidance – and thus,  perhaps,  with
more inclusive and more equitable AI-driven decision-making.
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Regarding scale and scope, most present AI-based products are developed by for-
profit enterprises and marketed to users – individual consumers, businesses or other
organizations,  government agencies,  etc.  –  under conditions of asymmetric
information and substantial  market power.  Moreover,  users’  values and preferences
implicated by the AI systems are often under-specified, ambiguous, and manipulable,
and may also exhibit  systematic disparities between immediate impulses and
considered longer-term values and welfare.  The relationships between AI systems
and users are thus ripe for exploitation to benefit  the dominant party,  e.g.,  by
bundling attractive services with subtle,  hard-to-observe costs such as loss of
privacy or autonomy, or by manipulating users’  adaptive and labile preferences to
their detriment.
Many alternative models for AI deployment are plausible, at a wide range of scales in
terms of people served and decision scope, and are potentially compatible with
better advancing the pursuit  of individual  well-being and shared values.  But
achieving this alignment will  require certain conditions,  once again mainly related to
the specification of objective functions but now with additional  complexities that
arise when multiple actors’  interests and values are implicated. Such complexities
include, for example,  typical  mixtures of shared, rival,  and conflicting interests
among actors,  as well  as collective-action problems and other pathologies of
collective choice.  In all  such settings,  AI systems must be faithful  servants – which
aim to advance as best they can the values and interests of the individual  or
collection they serve,  even when these are tentative,  imperfectly understood, and
require continual  adjustment – but with no consideration of the interests of the
agent who developed or applied the AI.
Even if  or when the associated technical  requirements are clear,  systems with these
attributes may well not be compatible with present AI development business models.
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Such systems will  need contextual  conditions that allow them to be developed,
deployed, adopted, and scaled – while maintaining fidelity to the progressive aims
and principles of the endeavor.  The group worked through various scenarios of
conditions that could enable such development,  allowing the desired systems to
gather initial development resources; secure the ongoing inputs needed to scale and
progress;  avoid being destroyed or corrupted by competition or attack from
incumbents whose rents are threatened; and operate sustainably over time.
Promising directions included a mix of strategic identification of initial  targets;
strategic early deployment of philanthropic or crowd-sources resources using open-
source development;  building strong early competitive positions through aggressive
exploitation of IP advantages,  coupled with binding pre-commitments to relinquish
these at some certain future date;  and compatible public policies regarding data
ownership,  IP,  antitrust,  and related matters.  The group recognized that they were
engaged in hopeful speculation about potential  technical capabilities and associated
societal conditions and impacts, when these conditions remain largely unexamined at
present.  They concluded, however,  that in view of stakes and plausibility,  these
development directions merit  high-priority investigation.
Concluding reflections:  Routes to progress in understanding and governing AI
impacts
As these short previews suggest,  the discussions and outputs of the summer
institute’s work groups were too broad-ranging and diverse to admit any single
summary or synthesis characterization.  Still,  a few salient themes emerged across
multiple groups,  including the following:
– The pluralism and ambiguity of values often embedded in current procedures,
practices,  and institutions,  which may be put at risk by automation or codification of
decision-making that exclusively optimizes for a single value – whether this single
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value is  efficiency or cost-minimization as often proposed, or something else;
– The rapidity with which considerations of AI deployment and impacts moves from
seemingly prosaic considerations of system and application characteristics,  to
engage deep, even foundational questions of social values, political organization, and
human identity;
–  The frequency with which new configurations of responsibility and authority,  in
which AI-based systems augment and partner with human decision-makers rather
than replacing them, appear superior on multiple dimensions to either human or
machine decision-makers operating alone;
– The value, in considering ill-posed problems marked by deep uncertainty,  of taking
a dialectical  approach – or alternatively,  an adversarial  or “red team-blue team”
approach. This was clearest in the work of the two groups that struggled, from nearly
opposite perspectives,  with the thorny problems posed by the widely proliferating
sets of AI ethical  principles.  The rich counterpoint between these two groups was
unplanned good luck that emerged from the process of proposing and selecting
workgroup projects.  These groups have not yet had the opportunity to respond to
each other directly:  they were aware of each other’s work from the brief plenary
check-ins,  but given the intensely compressed schedule of the summer institute
there was little opportunity for substantive interaction between groups.  Each
group’s work is  limited and incomplete,  in line with the aims of this rapid-output
publication – as indeed are the outputs of all  the workgroups.  Yet they are also
powerfully mutually enriching,  offering complementary perspectives on the urgent
question of how to inject ethical  considerations into AI system development in
practice,  each hinting at potential  correctives to the limitations of the other.  They
thus provide great heuristic value informing concrete early actions on a problem that
defies resolution in any single step.
– The urgent imperative of finding footholds for progress in efforts to assess and
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govern mid-term developments and impacts.  This is  the place where immediate
concerns and conflicts that suggest obvious – if  unavoidably incomplete – responses
shades into potentially transformative impacts.  Yet this is  also where early
interventions hold the possibility of high-leverage benefits, even despite the relative
scarcity of attention now being directed to these problems and the profound
methodological  challenges of developing disciplined and persuasive
characterizations of risks and responses.
In addition to the substantive richness of the discussions and outputs,  the Summer
Institute also represented an experiment in process that greatly exceeded our
expectations,  which we believe offers significant insights into how to stimulate
effective conversations and collective activities that deliver real  progress on wicked
problems like AI impacts,  governance,  and ethics.  We noted above the conditions
that make understanding or practical guidance on these issues so difficult to achieve,
despite the flood of attention they are receiving – including deep uncertainty,  rapid
technical progress, and fragmented knowledge and expertise. Given that the familiar
approach of waiting until  impacts are determinate is  insufficiently precautionary,
what types of activity or process might promise useful  insights for assessment or
governance action? There is  obviously no determinate checklist  available,  but a few
conditions and criteria appear likely.
–  It  is  necessary to mobilize multiple areas of relevant knowledge, expertise,  and
method – both across research and scholarly disciplines,  and between academia and
multiple domains of practice – because the problems’ tentacles extend far broader
than any single community of inquiry or practice;
– It  is  not sufficient to bring suitably broad collections of relevant expertise
together;  it  is  also necessary to facilitate sustained, intensive interaction,  in which
people dig hard into each other’s concepts,  methods,  terminologies,  and habits of
Artificial Intelligence’s Societal Impacts, Governance, and
Ethics: Introduction to the 2019 Summer Institute on AI and
Society and its rapid outputs
by: Edward Parson, Alona Fyshe and Dan Lizotte
| 24
thought – to avoid the common failure mode of interdisciplinary activities, superficial
agreement without actual  advance of understanding;
– The problem of AI impacts and governance is both fast and slow: rapid pieces of
technical  progress and reactions to them add up to transformative changes over
decades. There is news every week, yet the problem is not going away any time soon.
There is  thus a need to broaden debate and build expertise along generational  lines
as well  as on other dimensions,  to integrate instruction and professional
development with parallel  efforts to advance understanding.  (This is  one respect
where the parallels between AI and climate change are instructive:  both issues
combine processes that operate on a wide range of time-scales,  although in climate
change there is  much better knowledge of the long-term behavior of the relevant
systems.)
– Knowledge in the field is  diffuse,  provisional,  rapidly evolving.  There is  not an
established and bounded body of knowledge sufficient to create an expert
community.  Plenty of expertise is  relevant,  but little that is  on-point,  certainly none
that provides clear guidelines for progress.
These conditions suggest there is  a need to encourage collaborative discussion and
shared work along multiple parallel  lines,  which in turn suggests a decentralized
approach to convening collaborative groups with the range of expertise needed to
generate and pursue specific promising questions and ideas.  The same conditions
also suggest a need for communication vehicles to share questions,  insights,
arguments,  and ideas,  which is  informed by relevant research and scholarship but
proceeds faster,  and more provisionally,  than normal conventions of research and
scholarship allow. Thus,  even with the existence of such communication vehicles,
there is also a need to develop a culture and practice of substantively rich but quick
exchange of ideas,  even provisional  and incomplete.  It  does defy academic
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convention,  but on issues like this,  rigor and completeness may be the enemy of
progress.
These requirements suggest that the Summer Institute was,  with small  exceptions,  a
nearly ideal model to advance understanding and capacity – on AI and society issues,
and on issues that exhibit similar characteristics. Indeed, the power of the model for
similar issues was substantiated by the success of another summer institute
convened two weeks later by one of the organizers here on a different issue,  the
governance of geoengineering. It appears to be a powerful model,  subject to various
conditions related to selection or participants,  available time, etc.,  which clearly
merits further development and application.  We wish we could claim to have been
prescient in designing this process,  but there were large elements of luck in the
outcomes of the Summer Institute.  Still,  the results –  both those experienced by
participants within the Summer Institute,  and those marked by these first-round
outputs – strike us as astonishing,  given their origin as outputs of less than two full
days of intensive focused work by newly formed groups.  This was an exciting
exercise to be a part of,  and we are deeply grateful to our faculty and participants –
for the intensity, intelligence, and good will of their shared explorations, and also for
their participation in this experiment and the significant intellectual  courage they
have exhibited in allowing their work to be disseminated here in this provisional,
incomplete form.
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For vivid illustration of this point,  see the recent collection of highly cogent,  yet2.
often mutually contradictory or incommensurable speculations on AI’s trajectory
and significance,  in John Brockman (ed.),  Possible Minds:  25 ways of looking at AI,
Penguin:  New York,  2019.
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For a more detailed characterization and examples of this intermediate range of3.
potential  impacts,  see Parson et al,  “Artificial  Intelligence in Strategic Context,”  at
https://aipulse.org.  See also Seth Baum, “Reconciliation between factions focused
on near-term and long-term artificial  intelligence,” AI and Society 33(4):565-572
(2018).
The authors thank Summer Institute faculty members Trooper Sanders and Michael4.
Karlin for discussions that identified and clarified these issues.
For younger readers,  this group’s title refers to Sir  Humphrey Appleby,  a fictitious5.
senior advisor (“permanent secretary”)  in the UK government in the classic BBC
television series,  “Yes,  Minister” and “Yes,  Prime Minister” between 1980 and 1988.
Both series provide deeply insightful  (and hilarious) views of the relationship
between advisors and political leaders in high-level policy decisions – and not just in
Britain.
For an insightful recent discussion of these issues, see J. Whittlestone et al, “Ethical6.
and societal  implications of algorithms, data,  and artificial  intelligence: a roadmap
for research,”  London: Nuffield Foundation,  2019,  at
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